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CJEU Cases C-157/15 Achbita
and C-188/15 Bougnaoui
Does ‘neutrality’ trump religious freedom?
1. Introduction
On  14  March  2017  the  CJEU
upheld the banning of the visible
display  of  any  political,
philosophical or religious sign in
the  workplace.  As  a  future
consequence,  European  companies  may  introduce  certain  rules  to
prohibit other religious, political and philosophical symbols. The cases
involved two female employees in France and in Belgium, who were
dismissed  for  refusing  to  remove  their  headscarves  which  covered
their hair and neck, but left the face visible. Both cases concern the
interpretation of ‘genuine and determining occupational requirements’
and discrimination on the  grounds of  religion or  belief  contrary  to
Directive 78/2000/EC.
2. Facts of the case
The  two  cases  that  were  decided  jointly  by  the  CJEU,  are  Samira

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Achbita  and  Centrum  voor  gelijkheid  van  kansen  en  voor
racismebestrijding v.  G4S Secure  Solutions  NV  and Asma  Bougnaoui,
Association  de  defense  des  droits  de  l’homme  (ADDH)  v.  Micropole
Univers SA.
The first case (Achbita) was referred by the Hof van Cassatie (Court of
Cassation) in Belgium and deals with a Muslim woman who worked as
a receptionist for G4S. At the time when Ms Achbita joined G4S, the
company had an unwritten rule according to which employees were
prohibited from wearing conspicuous signs of a political, philosophical
or religious nature in the workplace. When Ms Achbita informed her
employer that she wanted to start wearing an Islamic headscarf, she
was  dismissed.  The  Belgian  Court  of  Cassation  asked  the  CJEU
whether the prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf (as provided
in  a  general  rule  of  a  private  undertaking)  amounts  to  direct
discrimination in the interpretation of Directive 78/2000/EC.
The second case (Bougnaoui) concerns a French IT consultant who was
requested  to  remove  her  headscarf  when  a  customer  complained.
When Ms Bougnaoui refused to comply, she was dismissed. The French
Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) which was seized with the case
asked  the  CJEU  whether  ‘the  willingness  of  an  employer  to  take
account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the employer’s
services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf may be
considered  a  “genuine  and  determining  occupational  requirement”’
within the meaning of Directive 78/2000/EC.
Both applicants challenged the dismissal, which they considered to be
discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  religion  or  belief  contrary  to
Directive 78/2000/EC. The relevant provision for these cases is Article
4 (1) of Directive 78/2000/EC which states that:
Notwithstanding Article 2 (1) and 2 (2), Member States
may provide that a difference of treatment which is
based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds
referred  to  in  Article  1  shall  not  constitute
discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the
particular occupational activities concerned or of the
context  in  which  they  are  carried  out,  such  a
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characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining
occupational requirement, provided that the objective
is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.
From a legal perspective, the issues that the applicants put forward are
similar, but slightly different. The Belgian Court asked whether there is
discrimination, within the meaning of Directive 78/2000/EC, when a
Muslim employee is  banned from wearing a  headscarf,  if  there is  a
well-established  workplace  rule  which  prohibits  the  wearing  of  all
conspicuous signs of political, philosophical and religious symbols in
the  workplace  in  pursuit  of  a  particular  conception  of  ‘neutrality’.
Conversely, the French Court asked whether the request of a client to
no longer have services provided by an employee wearing the Islamic
headscarf  is  a  genuine  and  determining  occupational  requirement
under Article 4 (1) of Directive 78/2000/EC.
The cases were heard jointly on 15 March 2016.
Opinions of the Advocates General
The opinion of the two AGs in the cases (AG Kokott and AG Sharpston)
urged the Court to take two different routes in the interpretation of
freedom  of  religion  at  the  workplace,  while  also  highlighting  the
importance of the case:
the Court is expected to give a landmark decision the
impact  of  which  could  extend  beyond  the  specific
context  of  the  main  proceedings  and  be  ground-
breaking  in  the  world  of  work  throughout  the
European Union, at least so far as the private sector is
concerned.
AG Sharpston outlined that EU law could provide more protection in
the context of Directive 78/2000/EC:
In the context of direct discrimination, the protection
given by EU law is stronger. Here, interference with a
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right  granted  under  the  ECHR  may  still  always  be
justified on the ground that  it  pursues a  legitimate
aim and is proportionate.  In contrast,  under the EU
legislation,  however,  derogations are permitted only
in  so  far  as  the  measure  in  question  specifically
provides for them.’
AG Sharpston favoured a heightened protection of freedom of religion
(in the context of EU non-discrimination law), by way of an effective
interpretation of norms. This,  Sharpston considered, could trigger a
difference in interpretation between the CJEU and the ECtHR, which
would  be  ‘a  wholly  legitimate  one’  in  light  of  Article  52  (3)  of  the
Charter. Conversely, AG Kokott stressed a more limited interpretation
of anti-discrimination provisions based on religion or belief under EU
law, highlighting that the latter does not involve ‘immutable physical
features  or  personal  characteristics,  such  as  gender,  age,  or  sexual
orientation,  [but]  rather…modes  of  construct  based  on  a  subjective
decision or conviction.’
The  value  of  religion  and  religious  manifestations  were  differently
interpreted  by  the  two  AGs.  AG Kokott  considered  that  religion  is
different compared to other characteristics mainly because:
the practice of religion is not so much an unalterable
fact as an aspect of an individual’s private life and one,
moreover,  over  which the employees concerned can
choose  to  exert  an  influence…an  employee  may  be
expected to moderate the exercise of his religion in
the workplace.
Conversely,  AG  Sharpston  in  Bougnaoui stated  that  for  believers,
religious  identity  and  the  possibility  to  manifest  it  is  not  only  a
marginal element, but, an ‘integral part of that person’s very being…it
would be entirely wrong to suppose that, whereas one’s sex and skin
colour accompany one everywhere, somehow one’s religion does not.’
The Judgments
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The  CJEU  judgment  related  to  Ms  Achbita  found  that  it  does  not
constitute ‘direct discrimination’ if a firm has an internal rule banning
the wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign. In so doing,
the firm equally  limits  the manifestation of  all  such beliefs  without
distinction.  In dismissing a  claim of  direct  discrimination,  the CJEU
noted that there was no information showing that Achbita was treated
differently to other employees. The CJEU then proceeded in assessing
a claim of indirect discrimination, and stated that:
An internal  rule  of  an  undertaking  which  prohibits
the visible wearing of  any political,  philosophical  or
religious  sign  does  not  constitute  direct
discrimination… By contrast, such a prohibition may
constitute indirect discrimination if it is established
that  the  apparently  neutral  obligation  it  imposes
results,  in  fact,  in  persons  adhering  to  a  particular
religion  or  belief  being  put  at  a  particular
disadvantage.  However,  such indirect  discrimination
may be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, such
as the pursuit by the employer, in its relations with its
customers,  of  a policy of political,  philosophical  and
religious  neutrality,  provided  that  the  means  of
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. It is
for  the  Belgian  Court  of  Cassation  to  check  those
conditions.
Regarding Ms Bougnaoui, the CJEU noted that it was not clear, based
on the reference to the CJEU, whether there had been a difference of
treatment based either directly or indirectly on religion or belief.
It  is  therefore for the French Court of  Cassation to
ascertain  whether  Ms  Bougnaoui’s  dismissal  was
based  on  non-compliance  with  an  internal  rule
prohibiting  the  visible  wearing  of  signs  of  political,
philosophical or religious beliefs. If that is the case, it
is for that court to determine whether the conditions
set out in the judgment in G4S Secure Solutions are
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satisfied,  that  is  to  say,  whether  the  difference  of
treatment, arising from an apparently neutral internal
rule that is likely to result, in fact, in certain persons
being put at a particular disadvantage, is objectively
justified by the pursuit of a policy of neutrality, and
whether it is appropriate and necessary.
The CJEU carried on to generally assert that:
[I]t  is  only  in  very  limited  circumstances  that  a
characteristic  related,  in  particular,  to  religion  may
constitute  a  genuine  and  determining  occupational
requirement, a concept which refers to a requirement
that  is  objectively  dictated  by  the  nature  of  the
occupational activities concerned or of the context in
which  they  are  carried  out  and  does  not  cover
subjective  considerations,  such  as  the  employer’s
willingness to take account of the particular wishes of
the customer.
3. Commentary and analysis
The simple question asked by the two cases at the CJEU is: Is a private
company allowed to dismiss a person because of the personal display
of clothing (and, arguably, symbols)?
It is well established law that ‘everyone has the right (…) either alone,
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching practice and observance.’ (art. 9
ECHR, art. 10 CFREU, art. 18 ICCPR) Freedom to manifest one’s religion
or belief is an essential part of freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion,  since  not  being  able  to  bear  witness  in  words  and  deeds
makes void the legal protection of the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion. The ECtHR, which has a long-standing jurisprudence on
the matter, has robustly outlined that religious symbols (either in the
form of  religious garments or objects)  constitute a manifestation of
freedom of religion or belief  and are worthy of protection (see also
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Adina Portaru, ‘Religious Symbols’,  in Clarke (ed.),  The ‘Conscience  of
Europe?’  (Kairos  2017)).  This  protection  can,  however,  be  limited  on
specific grounds:  ‘public  safety and order,  health,  morals  or  for  the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ (art. 9(2) ECHR)
This basic position is identified in today’s judgment of the CJEU, which
highlighted  that:  ‘the  concept  of  religion  must  be  interpreted  as
covering both the fact of having religious belief and the freedom of
persons to manifest that belief in public.’ The CJEU analysis carried on
to  assess  whether  the  treatment  limiting  religious  manifestations
amounts to direct or indirect discrimination.
Under Directive 78/2000/EC, direct discrimination occurs where one
person is treated less favourably than another has been or would be
treated in a comparable situation, on the ground of religion or belief.
Such  a  difference  of  treatment  is  allowed  in  two  very  limited
exceptions: a genuine and determining occupational requirement, and
regarding  a  number  of  occupational  activities  within  churches  and
ethos-based organisations.
Moreover,  indirect  discrimination  focuses  on  the  effects  which  an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would have, so as to
put  persons  having  a  particular  religion  or  belief  at  a  particular
disadvantage  compared  with  other  persons.  Such  indirect
discrimination could be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, if the
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
In Achbita,  the Court indicated that the general policy of ‘neutrality’
may  be  legitimate  insofar  as  it  only  extends  to  customer-facing
employees.  When  the  Court  turns  to  the  question  of  necessity,  it
adopts an unhelpful piece of circular reasoning. The Court suggested
that the measure will be necessary if the rule covers ‘only G4S workers
who interact with customers.’  But that was the reasoning applied to
consider the aim to be legitimate and there is no further examination
as to why this measure is proportionate.
Such a corporate policy of so-called neutrality should not give a carte
blanche to discriminate. It is always necessary to assess the context in
which the policy was adopted, the aim pursued, and the necessity of
implementing the measure.
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In assessing proportionality, an analysis of the measure’s impact on the
applicant is also necessary, since not all addressees of the measure are
impacted in the same way. For example, an atheist is impacted in a
minimal way by a company ban on religious symbols. Conversely, for a
practicing believer, such a ban has a deep, long-lasting and significant
impact, affecting the core of his identity.
Furthermore,  the legal  analysis  should examine whether there were
any less restrictive means of achieving the aim in question. The CJEU
seems to suggest, through today’s ruling, that the manifestation of the
fundamental right to freedom of religion or belief can be suppressed at
the simple will of employers, without any further legal check.
This contradicts Article 9 of the ECHR and the relevant jurisprudence
of the ECtHR, which highlights that ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion
or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ Such limitations are
assessed  on  a  case  by  case  basis,  by  engaging  in  a  test  of
proportionality, necessity, and balancing.
Even in the contentious cases at the ECtHR the Strasbourg Court goes
thorough such steps. For example, in the S.A.S. v. France case, which
dealt  with  the  ban  on  head  pieces  covering  the  face,  the  ECtHR
mentioned:
In view of its impact on the rights of women who wish
to  wear  the  full-face  veil  for  religious  reasons,  a
blanket ban on the wearing in public places of clothing
designed  to  conceal  the  face  can  be  regarded  as
proportionate  only  in  a  context  where  there  is  a
general threat to public safety.
The ECtHR then carried on to say that there had been no threat to
public  safety  in  France  such  as  could  justify  a  general  ban  on  the
manifestation  of  religious  freedom.  It  did  however  approve  of  the
French measure on the grounds of the ‘right and freedoms of others.’
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Competition between ECtHR and CJEU
The recent case highlights issues of competition and conflict of human
rights interpretations. The ECtHR has engaged in the interpretation of
Article  9  in  the context  of  religious  symbols  in  a  number  of  cases,
including Șahin v. Turkey, Lautsi v. Italy, and Eweida and Others v. UK.
Criticism of the heavy reliance on the margin of appreciation, artificial
difference beween powerful  religious  symbols  and ‘passive  religious
symbols’  has  been  levelled  in  respect  of  the  Court’s  sometimes
inconsistent jurisprudence in this area.
It has fueled the hopes of practitioners and academics that the CJEU
would develop a more solid interpretation of freedom of religion and
non-discrimination,[1] in what was perceived the broader context in
which the CJEU operates.[2]
By placing corporate policies of so-called neutrality above freedom to
manifest religion, the CJEU judgment dashes the hope for a robust and
consistent protection of freedom of religion. Quite on the contrary, the
CJEU judgment lowers the protection of freedom of religion or belief
set out by the ECtHR in Eweida and Others v. UK. Therein, the ECtHR
explicitly stated that it does not rank corporate image or profile of the
employer above the right to manifest religious beliefs by the employee.
Ms Eweida, a practising Christian employed by British Airways, argued
that her employer infringed her freedom of religion, by banning her
wearing of a visible Christian cross in the performance of her working
duties. The ECtHR found that there had been a violation of Article 9
and highlighted that:
[T]he Court has reached the conclusion in the present
case that a fair balance was not struck. On one side of
the  scales  was  Ms  Eweida’s  desire  to  manifest  her
religious  belief.  As  previously  noted,  this  is  a
fundamental  right:  because  a  healthy  democratic
society  needs  to  tolerate  and sustain  pluralism and
diversity;  but  also  because  of  the  value  to  an
individual who has made religion a central tenet of his
or her life to be able to communicate that belief  to
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others.  On  the  other  side  of  the  scales  was  the
employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image.
The  Court  considers  that,  while  this  aim  was
undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic courts accorded
it  too much weight.  Ms Eweida’s  cross was discreet
and  cannot  have  detracted  from  her  professional
appearance. There was no evidence that the wearing
of  other,  previously  authorised,  items  of  religious
clothing,  such  as  turbans  and  hijabs,  by  other
employees,  had  any  negative  impact  on  British
Airways’ brand or image. Moreover, the fact that the
company was able to amend the uniform code to allow
for the visible wearing of religious symbolic jewellery
demonstrates that the earlier prohibition was not of
crucial importance.
4. Conclusion
The  ruling  of  the  CJEU  is  problematic.  Firstly,  it  departs  from  the
established analysis of limitations on fundamental rights set out by the
ECtHR,  and  it  does  so  in  a  somewhat  circular  way.  By  failing  to
properly assess the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the measure, and
by  not  even  considering  its  necessity,  the  CJEU  allows  private
businesses to implement rules which violate the fundamental right to
freedom of religion, and lowers the protection of religious freedom set
out by the ECtHR. Differing standards as between the two top courts
in  Europe  will,  in  the  long  run,  lead  to  inconsistency  and  to  the
fragmentation of human rights.
Secondly,  the  CJEU  missed  an  opportunity  to  stress  the  need  to
accommodate  different  convictions  and  beliefs  in  an  increasingly
diverse  European  society.  It  is  the  Court’s  duty  to  accommodate
different  convictions  and  beliefs  rather  than  force  a  so-called
neutrality, which washes away all manifestations of religion or belief.
The only hint of an accommodation is found in the Achbita judgment:
In the present case, so far as concerns the refusal of a
worker  such  as  Ms  Achbita  to  give  up  wearing  an
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Islamic headscarf when carrying out her professional
duties for G4S customers, it is for the referring court
to ascertain whether, taking into account the inherent
constraints to which the undertaking is subject, and
without G4S being required to take on an additional
burden,  it  would  have  been  possible  for  G4S,  faced
with such a refusal, to offer her a post not involving
any visual  contact  with those customers,  instead of
dismissing her.
Unfortunately, the standard advanced by the Court is one in which an
employer is required to accommodate the employee unless it would
impose  an  “additional  burden”,  and  in  a  way  that  presupposes  the
validity  of  banishing a  religious  employee from public  view.  That  is
perhaps a step beyond the pre-Eweida test which simply considered
any claim vitiated by the fact an employee could get another job, but is
a long way from a legal standard which protects religious freedom.
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